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LA.Boa LAw-BACK PAY AwARDs-DuTY OF D1sCHARGED EMPLOYEE To
SBBK OTIIBR EMPLOYMENT-The National Labor Relations Board issued a
back pay order1 in favor of the victim of a discriminatory discharge, computing
the award on the basis of the earnings of the dischargee's replacement during
the period of discrimination less the amount actually earned by the dischargee
in other employment during the same period. The dischargee had registered
with the state unemployment agency but had earned only $294.20 over a twoyear period. On petition for enforcement of the order, held, order set aside
and case remanded. Where a dischargee earns only a small amount of money
over a long period of time, mere proof of registration with a state unemployment agency is not sufficient evidence that the defendant has fulfilled his
duty to use reasonable diligence in seeking other employment. NLRB v.
Pugh & Barr, Inc., (4th Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 409.
The NLRB has statutory authority to issue orders for the reinstatement,
with back pay, of employees who are discharged as the result of an unfair
labor practice.2 The awarding and computation of back pay in a reinstatement order are matters largely within the discretion of the Board.3 This
discretion is limited by the requirement that there be deducted from the pay
losses of the employee any earnings which he willfully failed to eam,4 including those which he did not earn as a result of a failure to use reasonable
diligence in seeking employment elsewhere.5 This duty to "mitigate damages"
is based upon the theory that the general purpose of a Board order is remedial,
not punitive,6 and that the purpose of a back pay order is therefore to make
the employee whole rather than to penalize the employer.7 It has also been
Pugh & Barr, Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 562 (1953).
Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (Supp.
V, 1952) §160(b).
s NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 73 S.Ct. 287 (1953); NLRB v.
Gullet Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 71 S.Ct. 337 (1950); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
U.S. 177, 61 S.Ct. 845 (1941).
4 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, note 3 supra.
r; NLRB v. Cheney California Lumber Co., (9th Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 333; NLRB
v. Cowell Portland Cement Co., (9th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 237; NLRB v. Condenser
Corp. of America, (3d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 67.
6 Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206 (1938).
7 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, note 3 supra; Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311
U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77 (1940). The view that back pay orders are designed to redress private
wrongs, rather than to discourage the committing of unfair labor practices, has been criticized. See, e.g., 42 CoL. L. REv. 443 at 451-453 (1942), and Justice Murphy's dissent in
the Phelps Dodge case, note 4 supra, at 200. The language of the decisions has been
consistently in accord with this view, but the actual holdings have not. In some cases the
dischargee has been made more than "whole." See, e.g., NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co.,
l
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said that this requirement is fair8 and promotes production and employment.9
The instant case presents two problems regarding the application of this policy:
(I) Who should have the burden of proof in showing presence or absence
of reasonable diligence on the part of the employee in seeking other employment? (2) What facts will constitute substantial evidence supporting a Board
finding that such diligence has been used? In an ordinary civil action by
an employee for the breach of an employment contract, the burden of proof
as to the employee's reasonable diligence in seeking other employment rests
with the wrongdoing employer.10 There seems to be no good reason for
not applying the same rule to cases involving the computation of back pay
under an NLRB reinstatement order. Since 1943, the Board has adhered to
the policy of holding registration with a state or federal employment agency
to be conclusive proof of reasonable diligence on the part of the dischargee.11
Under this rule, the proof of such registration has precluded the employer
from producing other evidence to show a lack of reasonable diligence and
has limited him to showing that the employee unreasonably refused an offer
of similar employment.12 The instant case indicates that a heavier burden
may rest upon the employee who earns only a small amount of money, or
is unemployed, over a long period of time. The court in such a case appears
ready to treat the mere failure to find employment as strong evidence of a
failure to use reasonable diligence in seeking employment.13 This inference
not only deprives the evidence of registration with an employment agency
of the substantiality -required to support a finding of reasonable diligence, but
it also creates a presumption against the use of reasonable diligence and in
effect places the burden of proof in such cases upon the discharged employee.
This result cannot be justified if the inference thus drawn is not clearly
reasonable. Its reasonableness, however, must necessarily depend upon a
number of variable factors such as the nature of the local economy and the
condition of the local labor market. It also presupposes serious doubts as to the
efficiency of government employment services. In addition to the doubtful logic
of the inference, it may also be criticized because of the complexities in NLRB
procedure that may be occasioned by its application. The reasonable dilinote 3 supra (as a result of back pay being computed on a quarterly basis); NLRB v.
Gullet Gin Co., note 3 supra (as a result of unemployment compensation benefits not being
deducted). It has often been held that the duty l:o pay created by a back pay order is of a
public and not a private nature. Amalgamated Utility Workers (C.I.O.) v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 60 S.Ct. 561 (1940); Waterman S. S. Corp. v. NLRB, (5th
Cir. 1941) 119 F. (2d) 760; NLRB v. Stackpole Carbon Co., (3d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d)
188; Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 73 S.Ct. 80 (1952).
s Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, note 3 supra, at 198.
9Id. at 200.
10 McCORMICK, DAMAGES §159 (1935); 5 CoRBIN, CoNTRAc-rs §1095 (1951); 134
A.L.R. 257 (1941).
11 Ohio Public Service Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 725 (1943), enforced (6th Cir. 1944) 144
F. (2d) 252; Harvest Queen Mill and Elevator Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 320 (1950).
12 Harvest Queen Mill and Elevator Co., note 11 supra.
13 "It is incredible that Bramer could not have earned more than this during that period
if he had made reasonable efforts to find employment.••." Principal case at 409.
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gence requirement was adopted by the United States Supreme Court over
objections by the Board that it would unduly complicate the administration
of its functions. 14 Justice Frankfurter answered these objections by saying
that the Board could retain a flexible control of its own procedures and thus
properly limit the scope of the inquiry.15 By denying the power of the
Board to give proof of registration with a government employment agency
conclusive effect, the court in the instant case appears to ignore this express
admonition of the Supreme Court and thus appears to endanger the effective
administration of the labor relations acts.
Howard A. Cole, S.Ed.

14 Phelps Dodge Corp.
15 Id. at 199-200.

v. NLRB, note 3 supra, at 198.

